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Comments
From Benevolent Administration to Government
Employee Inventions, Human Genomes, and
Exclusive Licensing: Is Governmental Ownership
of Patents Constitutional?
Throughout its history, the use by the United States Govern-
ment of its large patent estate' has been benignly public orient-
ed.2 This policy has rendered almost invisible any constitutional
objections that exist with respect to the ownership by the United
States Government of patents of its own issue.3 This invisibili-
ty4 has been so complete that over the years, judicial, legisla-
1. The phrase "patent estate" refers to the sum total of all patent interests
held by a person or entity. The federal government is one of the largest owners of
United States patents. John E. Schneider, Federal Employees and Patents: A Review
of Government Invention Rights Determinations, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY
383, 383 (1992).
2. See Note, Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Pub-
lication versus Patenting, 55 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1091 (1967) [hereinafter Effective Use of
Government-Owned Rights]. See also Peter Berger, Utilization or Dispensa-
tion-Suggestions for the Government's Patent Procurement Program, 48 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 449, 450 (1966); Benjamin Bernstein, An Analysis of Federal
Government Rights and Interests in the American Patent System, 14 N.Y. L. F. 516,
516 (1968).
3. This comment focuses on the constitutionality and the propriety of the fed-
eral government owning patents. The separate issue of whether the federal govern-
ment may validly own patents issued by another country is not addressed.
4. An excellent example of the invisibility of the issue is found in a 1924
Attorney General Opinion which recommended the licensing of government-owned
patents, because without such licensing "the invention is practically buried and un-
available for the life of the patent, the public is denied the advantage of the inven-
tion, and so the object of the constitutional provision is substantially nullified or
evaded with no consequent advantage to the federal government." 34 Op. Att'y Gen.
320, 329 (1924). While the opinion reflects a perception that the effect of governmen-
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tive, and executive actions and decisions dealing with the sub-
ject of federal governmental ownership of United States patents
have always been made with the implicit assumption that no
constitutional infirmity exists.5 In fact, the issue has never been
decided by any court." Likewise, relatively few commentators
have made mention of even the possibility of a problem.7 Most
commentators who have raised the issue have dismissed it ei-
ther by stating that the issue has been decided by prolonged
practice8 or by confining its dimensions to that of legislative
authorization.9
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the benign char-
acter of the federal government's policy in administration of its
patent estate has been evidenced by its general practice of issu-
ing unconditional, royalty-free licenses to any person on re-
quest." Additionally, the federal government has made no ef-
fort to police the unlicensed use of its patents." The lack of
enforcement has been so complete that the only occasion in
which the federal government asserted its patent rights against
an alleged infringer was by way of counterclaim; and in that
case the court dismissed the counterclaim on the ground that
the historical lack of patent enforcement resulted in an implied
tal patent ownership may be counter to the purpose of the Constitution, the focus
on the possibility of an advantage to the federal government of patent ownership ob-
scures the fact that there is something fundamentally wrong with the practice.
5. Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights, supra note 2, at 1089.
6. A thorough search of the West's AMERICAN DIGEST SYSTEM, which covers
the period of 1658 to the present, revealed no decision on the issue. See also Frank
J. Wille, Government Ownership of Patents, 25 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
729, 730 (1943).
It has been suggested that the reason the federal government has been re-
luctant to enforce its patent rights is to avoid testing in court the constitutionality
of governmental ownership of patents of its own issue. Effective Use of Government-
Owned Rights, supra note 2, at 1088-89.
7. One commentator simply stated that, "aside from the question of consti-
tutionality, there appears to be no logical reason why . .. . [the federal government]
cannot hold or own the (patent] grant, outright." Simon Broder, Government Own-
ership of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 697, 699 (1936).
8. See, e.g., Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights, supra note 2, at 1089.
But see Bernstein, supra note 2, at 517-19 (bolstering the conclusion of justification
through custom, but defending against arguments contra with the argument that
governmental ownership is permissible because the federal government has not en-
forced the exclusivity embodied in the patent rights). The argument by Bernstein
overlooks the fact that although the federal govermuent's patent policy so far has
been benign, it may become repressive tomorrow and, in any case, good intentions
alone do not make a governmental practice constitutional.
9. See Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal Technology Transfer, 5 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENV'T 133, 137-38 (1994).




license to the alleged infringer.1" This lack of active use of pat-
ent rights by the federal government was consistent with its
primary purpose of acquiring patents for defensive purposes.
That is, the federal government acquired patents for the purpose
of preventing others from obtaining patent rights to the subject
invention and thereby protected itself from claims of in-
fringement." As will be discussed later, other means exist for
acquiring this protection at a lower cost and without the consti-
tutional problems of the federal government owning self-issued
patents.
Recently, two actions of the federal government have begun to
raise the specter of the dangers inherent in governmental own-
ership of patents of its own issue. The first is the adoption by
the federal government of a policy of granting exclusive licenses
to its patents. 14 The second is the federal government's efforts
to patent the mapping of human DNA, sometimes referred to as
the "human genome."5 Though these topics will not be further
discussed in this comment, they are mentioned to illustrate the
fact that governmental patent ownership has the potential of
dangerous abuse. For example, the granting of exclusive licenses
opens the door to the practice of bestowing favors at the grace of
the federal government as a sovereign. Cornering the patent
rights on the human genome illustrates how the federal govern-
ment can employ its huge scientific and legal resources to poten-
tially stifle a nascent industry of tremendous potential for hu-
manitarian and commercial benefit. Considering these two gov-
ernmental actions together, it is evident that the danger exists
for the federal government to first acquire the exclusive rights to
a vital technology and then to dispense those rights to persons
or entities which are in its favor. In short, it is possible for the
federal government to create the sort of monopoly by "royal
12. See Tektronix Inc. v- United States, 351 F.2d 630, 630-33 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
13. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 518-19.
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 209(c) (1988). Admittedly, at this point in history, the
exclusive licensing has the benign objective of promoting the transfer of governmen-
tal inventions to the private sector. Christopher J. Harnett, The Human Genome
Project and the Downside of Federal Technology Transfer, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY &
ENV'T 151, 159-60 (1994). However, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: "It may
be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegiti-
mate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Boyd v. Unit-
ed States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885) (holding unconstitutional a statutory provision
allowing the federal government, in internal revenue matters, a presumption of proof
regarding the alleged contents of books which a party failed to produce under sub-
poena).
15. Paul Ginsburg, Patentability and Technology Transfer Issues Relating to the
NIH Patent Applications, 382 PLI/PAT 441, 441 (1994).
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prerogative" which the Framers of the Constitution found to be
so abhorrent."
After a brief description in Section I of what patents are and
how the federal government obtains them, this comment pres-
ents in Section II arguments as to why it is unconstitutional for
the United States Government to acquire patents of its own
issue. Section III presents non-constitutionally based arguments
as to why it is also improper for the federal government to hold
its own patents. Section IV explains why it is unnecessary for
the federal government to acquire patents. Finally, Section V
concludes that the weight of the arguments points to the result
that governmental ownership of patents of its own issue is both
unconstitutional and improper.
I. How THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACQUIRES OWNERSHIP OF
PATENTS
A. The Definition of "Patent"
A patent is the grant to an inventor by a government of a
limited monopoly on an invention. 7 A patent is purely statuto-
ry in nature. 8 Being a grant by a sovereign, it is operative only
within the territory controlled by the sovereign."9 A patent is
also a collection of rights0 given to an inventor by a govern-
ment2 in exchange for the publication by the inventor of a de-
scription of the invention that is detailed enough to allow one
skilled in the art to reproduce the invention.22 Thus, a patent is
a contract between a government and an inventor.23 The unify-
16. See infra Section II for a discussion of the disdain of the Framers for mo-
nopolies by royal prerogative.
17. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw BASICS § 1.03 (1993).
18. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.3 (1964) (citing
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)).
19. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 19.02.
20. JAMEs E. HAWES, PATENT APPLICATION PRACTICE § 2.01 (2d ed. 1993).
21. In the United States, only the federal government may grant patents. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) ("[S]tate
regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the
balance struck by Congress in our patent laws.").
22. HAWES, supra note 20, § 2.01. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
23. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.);
National Hollow-Brake-Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co., 106 F: 693,
701 (8th Cir. 1901); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 ("The federal patent
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for the creation and disclosure
of . . . advances in technology . . . in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years.") (emphasis added). Contra In re Breslow, 616 F.2d
516, 518 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (Rich, J.) (rejecting as inapt the description of a patent
as a contract and instead characterizing a patent as a statutory right).
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ing characteristic of patent rights is the authority granted by the
federal government to the inventor to exclude others from mak-
ing, selling, or using the invention within the country issuing
the patent24 for a fixed period of time." No similar grant of
authority existed at common law.26 Paradoxically, a patent does
not give the inventor the right to make, sell, or use the patented
invention," a right which exists at common law.2" At the con-
clusion of the statutory period, the patent expires and the in-
vention passes into the public domain.29 At that time, any per-
son may freely make use of the invention."
During the limited period of its enforceability, a patent cre-
ates a monopoly in its owner.3" The purpose of the monopoly is
to provide incentive to the inventor to create and bring forth
new knowledge.32 By statute, pursuant to constitutional restric-
tions, a patent may only be granted to an inventor or the
inventor's assignees.
In order to be patentable, an invention must meet the require-
ments set forth by statute. The statutory prerequisites to obtain-
ing a patent are strictly enforced. 4 The subject matter of an
invention must be within one of four specified classes of patent-
able subject matter. The classes are: new and useful processes,
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. New
and useful improvements of subjects within these classes are
also patentable.36 Abstract ideas are not within the statutory
classes and therefore are not patentable." Further, an inven-
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (amended 1995). As of June 8, 1995, the patent peri-
od for a utility patent is the balance as of the date of patent issuance of the twenty
year period which began on the date of filing. Prior to June 8, 1995, patents were
issued with a statutory period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (amended 1995).
26. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 1.03.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
30. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
31. See ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 1.03.
32. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
33. The statutory requirements for the assignment of an invention are given
in 35 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (1988). These statutes were enacted pursuant to constitu-
tional authority: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
34. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
36. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230.
37. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 1.03.
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tion must be novel.38 This means that the invention could not
have been known or used in the United States by others prior to
its invention by the person applying for the patent as the inven-
tor.39 It also means that there can be no printed publication or
public use of the invention a year or more prior to the submis-
sion of the patent application.' An invention must also be non-
obvious.41 The non-obviousness requirement means that in light
of the prior art in the field of the invention, the invention as a
whole would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art
at the time the invention was made.2
A patent has, by statute, the attributes of personal proper-
ty.' Ownership of a patent, as with any property, carries with
it the right to exclusive enjoyment." The ownership interest in
a patent may be assigned45 or licensed either exclusively or
non-exclusively." Inventors often assign their rights to an in-
vention by way of an employment contract.47 An assignment to
an employer may also be inferred from the circumstances of
employment." Even absent such an express or implied assign-
ment, an employer may gain the right to use an employee's
invention as a "shop right"49 under certain circumstances. 0
The remedy for the infringement of a patent by a private
party is an award of damages sufficient to compensate the pat-
ent owner for the infringement.51 At a minimum, the compensa-
tion is equal to the value of a reasonable royalty and costs and
interest fixed by a court.52 Treble damages may be awarded for
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
39. Id. § 102(a).
40. Id. § 102(b).
41. Id. § 103.
42. Id. Prior art "includes any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions, and
patents which pertain to, but predate, [the] invention in question." BLAcK's LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
44. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 1.03.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
46. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 12.02[2]. A license is non-exclusive if it does
not expressly preclude the licensor from licensing to others. Id.
47. Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the Intellectual
Property?, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUS. POL'Y 639, 644 (1986).
48. United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187-92 (1933).
49. The term "shop right" refers to the right that an employer receives to
practice an invention in a business or shop when the employee used the employer's
resources to make or develop the invention. See ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 12.06.
50. Dubilier Condensor, 289 U.S. at 188-89. See also ROSENBERG, supra note
17, § 12.06.




willful infringement."3 The patent owner also has available the
remedy of an injunction against an infringing private party to
prevent future acts of infringement."
In contrast, the remedies of a patent owner against the feder-
al government for its unlicensed use of a patent are more limit-
ed. This is because the federal government has the statutory
right 5 to make unlicensed use of any patent it issues."6 How-
ever, a patent owner has the remedy of suing the federal govern-
ment in the United States Court of Claims for an amount equal
to a reasonable royalty. 7 Injunctive relief is not available
against the federal government."
B. How the United States Government Obtains Patents
The United States Government owns many of the patents it
issues.59 Presently, the most important method of patent acqui-
sition by the federal government is the acquisition of rights to
inventions made by its employees.0 The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp.,1 ruled that in the
absence of statutory authority, the federal government, like any
employer, has a common law right to inventions created by its
employees.6 2 Therefore, if an employee is employed to improve
processes or to invent, the resulting invention belongs to the fed-
eral government as the employer.63 However, the Court stated
that if an employee is not employed for these purposes, the
rights to the invention remain in the employee." In such a
53. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 18.02(2].
54. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988).
56. Richard McGrath, The Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United States
Government or its Contractors, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 349, 351 (1991). The sanction for
unauthorized use by the federal government extends to its contractors. Id.
57. McGrath, supra note 56, at 352. McGrath points out that a suit for unau-
thorized use of a patent does not sound in tort, as it would for a suit for infrin-
gement against a private party, but rather is based upon the Eminent Domain theo-
ry. Id. The Eminent Domain theory is based on the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, which states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The provision for an action by a patent
owner against the federal government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 amounts to a waiver
of sovereign immunity which would otherwise protect the federal government from
suits. McGrath, supra note 56, at 351.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 383.
60. Id.
61. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).





case, the Court opined, if the employee had made use of the
employer's time or other resources in making or perfecting the
invention, the employer is entitled to a "shop right" in the inven-
tion.65 Therefore, the employer effectively receives an implicit
non-exclusive license to use the invention.
In 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order Number
10,096, which directed all federal agencies to acquire rights to
inventions produced by their employees.6 The directive re-
quired each agency to make a determination of whether the
rights to an invention should remain in the employee or should
be taken over by the federal government.67 Executive Order
10,096 created rebuttable presumptions patterned after the
Dubilier common law rule as to whether the invention belongs to
the federal government or the employee." An additional consid-
eration in the creation of a presumption in favor of the federal
government is the level of governmental interest in patenting
the invention.69
The constitutionality of Executive Order 10,096 was attacked
twice on the grounds that the President lacked the authority to
order the acquisition of a federal government employee's inven-
tion and that such an acquisition amounted to a taking without
due process. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kaplin v.
Corcoran,7 held that legislative authority existed for the execu-
tive order.7 Ten years later, the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, in Heinemann v. United States,72 held that the ad-
ministrative process for determining the ownership of the inven-
tion accompanied by its optional court review satisfied the Due
Process Clause.7 The issue of whether it was constitutional for
the federal government to own patents was not raised.
The federal government has several lesser sources of patent
acquisition. One source is the acquisition of patents from its
contractors and grantees.74 Another source is by the seizure of
65. rd.
66. Exec. Order No. 10,096, 3 C.F.R. § 292 (1949-1953), as amended by Exec.




70. 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1976).
71. Kaplin, 545 F.2d at 1077.
72. 796 F.2d 451 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
73. Heinemann, 796 F.2d at 455-56.
74. See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Need for a Uniform Govern-
ment Patent Policy: The D.O.E. Example, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103 (1990) (review-
ing the federal government patent policy using the Department of Energy as an
example and discussing the difficulty of establishing policy uniformity throughout the
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patent rights held by enemies as a wartime defensive mea-
sure.75 Some patent acquisition methods of minor importance
are the outright donation by the inventor or his assignee of a
patent to the federal government, the purchase of a patent by
the federal government, and the acquisition of a patent through
an international agreement.7"
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL
OWNERSHIP OF PATENTS
The United States Government is a government of enumerat-
ed powers.77 Thus, the federal government has only those pow-
ers expressly granted to it by the Constitution along with those
powers which are implicitly necessary for carrying out the enu-
merated powers.78 The constitutional authority for the federal
government to issue patents is found in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, which reads as follows:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
This Clause, referred to as the "Intellectual Property
Clause,"8° grants Congress the authority to issue both patents
and copyrights.8 The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes
the granting of patents by the federal government, but there is
no power, either expressed or implied, in the Constitution that
grants the federal government the authority to acquire its own
patents." Not only is there no constitutional authorization, but
governmental ownership of the patents it issues obstructs the
very purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause and thus is in
diametrical opposition to the intentions of the Framers.8 '
It is important to understand that the Intellectual Property
federal government).
75. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 523-25.
76. Berger, supra note 2, at 450.
77. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.).
78. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 91 (1907).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United
States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 1, 1 n.1 (1994). Other names which have
been used to describe the Clause are the "Patent Clause," the "Copyright Clause,"
and the "Science and Useful Arts Clause." Id.
81. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 1 n.1.
82. Wille, supra note 6, at 758.
83. See infra Section II.A.
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Clause contains the only grant of power to Congress in the Con-
stitution which was made with the particular means of exercise
specified."M Thus, not only did the Drafters of the Constitution
state the objects for which the Intellectual Property Clause was
to be used, but they also specified the only means by which the
power could be exercised.8" The United States Supreme Court
plainly recognized this fact in Graham v. John Deere Co.:86
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified au-
thority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of
advances in the "useful arts." It was written against the backdrop of the
practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-of the
Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public.... The Congress in
the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints impos-
ed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. 7
There are several important points to observe in the above
quoted passage. First, the historical backdrop-that is the prac-
tice of patents and monopolies in general at the time of the writ-
ing of the Constitution-is a very important consideration in the
interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause as both a grant
and a limitation of power. Second, within the limited scope of the
power, Congress may take no action which contravenes the pur-
poses of the power. Thus, Congress' actions pursuant to the Intel-
lectual Property Clause power must work only to promote the
useful arts. This implies that Congress is not permitted to em-
ploy the Intellectual Property Clause power to grant patents in a
manner which retards the advancement of the useful arts. Lastly,
Congress may not take knowledge which already belongs to the
public and place restrictions on it by the issuance of a patent.
As will be seen, the ownership of patents by the federal gov-
ernment runs counter to all of these limitations which the Su-
84. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 32.
85. The inclusion of a specific means of execution in the Intellectual Property
Clause takes on added importance when it is considered that the Committee of De-
tail, which was responsible for preparing the working draft from which the delegates
crafted the Constitution, deliberately avoided putting such detail into the clauses so
as to make it more likely that the Constitution's provisions would be adaptable to
times and events. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 32.
86. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
87. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
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preme Court has found to be contained within the Intellectual
Property Clause. Further, the Intellectual Property Clause's
implicit prohibition of governmental ownership of patents of its
own issue is not overridden by any other constitutional provision.
A. The "Intentions of the Framers" Argument Against Federal
Governmental Ownership of Patents
At the time of the writing and adoption of the Constitution,
Americans had an instinctive aversion to monopolies.' Indeed,
it was a monopoly on tea that sparked the American Revolu-
tion. 9 George Mason, a Virginia delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, refused to sign the Constitution because he per-
ceived that it left open the possibility that Congress could inter-
pret the general clause at the end of the enumerated powers to
grant monopolies in trade and commerce.90 The ratifying con-
ventions of four states requested or recommended that
amendments be made with specific prohibitions against Congress
granting monopolies in commerce.9' Thomas Jefferson initially
opposed the inclusion of the Intellectual Property Clause in the
Constitution.92 Jefferson understood that even this limited au-
thorization of monopolies could be subject to abuse and,
therefore, he thought it not worth the risk to "meddle with it.""3
Jefferson, after learning that the Constitution had been ratified,
wrote to James Madison calling for a Bill of Rights which would
restrict monopolies.9" Later, as Secretary of State overseeing the
issuance of patents, Jefferson noted the difficulty in granting pat-
ents of "drawing a line between the things which are worth to
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent."5
A century and a half prior to the writing of the United States
Constitution, abuses of the royal prerogative in England in grant-
ing monopolies had been curbed by the adoption by Parliament of
the Statute of Monopolies of 1623.96 The Statute of Monopolies
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id.
90. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 55.
91. Id. at 55-56. The states were Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
and North Carolina. Id.
92. Id. at 54-55.
93. Id. at 54 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsier L'Hommande
(Aug. 9, 1787), cited in Paul E. Holbrook, Science us. Gadgets, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOCkY
87, 91-92 (1951)).
94. Id. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966).
95. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
96. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 12.
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outlawed "all monopolies, grants, licenses, and letters patent...
for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of any-
thing within the realm." 7 One of the narrow group of exceptions
to the general prohibition of monopolies was the grant of a patent
to an inventor allowing the sole use of the invention for a period
of fourteen years from the grant of the patent. 8
Notwithstanding the general animosity toward monopolies, the
granting of patents to inventors under the exception to the Stat-
ute of Monopolies was perceived in the eighteenth century as
having played an important role in the industrial development of
Great Britain." In a number of American colonies prior to the
American Revolution, a patent custom existed that conveyed
through private legislative acts exclusive grants of privilege to
inventions and importation."® Thus, the power to grant patents
to inventors was included in the Constitution but only with due
caution. The effect of the Statute of Monopolies on the Framers
of the Constitution and their concrete perception of the possibility
of abuse of the patent power is aptly described by legal historian
Edward C. Walterscheid:
[I]t is precisely because the delegates were familiar with the Statute of
Monopolies either on legal or political terms that they were not about to
give the Congress any general power to create monopolies. A broad power
to create monopolies was too reminiscent of the power of the royal pre-
rogative which was the last thing anyone ... wanted to grant to either
the executive or legislative branches contemplated by the proposed Con-
stitution. While the Framers were cognizant that the patent grant consti-
tuted an express exception to the general ban on monopolies that had
existed in England for more than one hundred and fifty years, they also
perceived patents to be monopolies, albeit of a limited and acceptable
type. Therefore, if the Framers were to give power to Congress to secure
exclusive rights for limited times to inventors in their discoveries, it was
necessary to do so expressly.'
It is clear that the majority of the Framers thought they had
prohibited Congress from being able to dispense monopolies ex-
cept by the narrow provision of a patent monopoly to an inventor
for the equally narrow purpose of providing incentive for the
development of industry. It necessarily follows that the Framers
did not intend for the federal government to have the ability to
acquire monopolies, which it could then dispense at its preroga-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 13-14. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 (1964).
99. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 14.
100. Id. at 14-17.
101. Id. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
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tive and grace, through the use of an artifice that would take the
patent granted to an inventor back into the hands of the federal
government. In short, it was not the intention of the Framers to
enable the federal government to acquire the ability to deal in
monopolies merely by having assigned to itself patents it issued
under the Intellectual Property Clause.
B. Obstruction of the Purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause
by Federal Governmental Patent Ownership
The Intellectual Property Clause, which grants to Congress its
patent and copyright powers, was written as a balanced sentence,
a form in common usage at the time of the writing of the Consti-
tution. 12 "The Clause begins by stating two objects to be pro-
moted, then names two types of persons to be encouraged, and
concludes with two types of subject matter to be protected."0 3
Separating out the provisions of the patent power, the Clause
reads as follows:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of ... useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right
to their.. . Discoveries."'
The "useful Arts" at the time of the writing of the Constitution
meant "helpful or valuable trades.""5 "Promote" at the time of
the writing of the Constitution had the meaning (similar to that
of today) of "to advance, to improve, to better."" Thus, "[t]o
promote the Progress of ... useful Arts" presupposed an inten-
tion to advance the helpful or valuable trades."7
As mentioned above, the United States Supreme Court in Gra-
ham held that the power of Congress under the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause is limited to the promotion of advances in the useful
arts.' The Graham Court also held that "Congress in the exer-
cise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints im-
posed by the stated constitutional purpose."" Thus, it is clear
102. John F. Oberlin, "Science" Versus "Useful Arts", A Cross-Word Puzzle Re-
solved, 33 J. PAT. OFFICE Soc'Y 399, 400 (1951).
103. Karl B. Lutz, The Constitution v. the Supreme Court Re: Patents for Inven-
tions, 13 U. Pir. L. REV. 449, 452 (1952).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
105. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 52.
106. Malcolm F. Baily, Progress as a Requirement to Patentability, 42 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 225, 226 (1960).
107. Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 52.
108. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
109. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
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that an act by Congress which restrains the advancement of the
useful arts would be both contrary to the Intellectual Property
Clause and outside of the power delegated by the Clause. But
governmental ownership of patents does just that by restraining
the progress of the useful arts in five significant ways.
First, by its very nature, a patent impedes, by the threat of
penalty of law, all but the patent owner and licensees from using
the invention or discovery that is the subject of the patent. The
Framers envisioned this detrimental restriction inherent in a
patent to be sufficiently counterbalanced by the incentive to in-
vent provided by the patent monopoly.11° The United States Su-
preme Court has held that patents are statutory monopolies
awarded to inventors for the purpose of encouraging invention by
rewarding the inventor with the right to exclude others from the
making, using, and selling of the subject invention for a fixed
number of years."' However, when the federal government ob-
tains a patent, the countervailing benefit of incentive to invent is
absent. The federal government is already required under the
Constitution to make expenditures for the public good."' Thus,
absent the incentive, the public must suffer the "embarrassment
of an exclusive patent" without obtaining any countervailing ben-
efit.
Second, under the patent statutes, a patent may not be issued
for an invention or discovery that has been published or non-
confidentially revealed to others prior to the filing of a patent
application."' Therefore, information developed under publicly
funded research programs necessarily must be kept from public
use while the federal government prepares its patent application.
This withholding of publicly procured information further retards
the advancement of the useful arts.
Third, the huge resources at the disposal of the federal govern-
ment may intimidate all but the largest of corporations from
competing in a race with the federal government to acquire a
patent. Not only are the research and development resources of
the federal government of gargantuan proportions," 4 but the
110. "The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any
concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts." Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
111. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
112. JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIoNAL ANALYSIS IN A NuTsHELL 174-75
(1979). All expenditures of the federal government must either be for the general
welfare or on behalf of a specific constitutional power. Id.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
114. See Walterscheid, supra note 74, at 104-05.
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legal and financial resources available to the federal government
to procure and defend a patent are relatively infinite. The threat
of such an overwhelming competitor can stifle the development of
an otherwise useful art. This is especially true when it is consid-
ered that in many cases private individuals and businesses need
to recoup their research investment by acquiring patent rights to
the commercialization of the fruits of their research."u As the
chances of winning the race for a Patent decrease, the incentive
of private parties for making investments in research and devel-
opment decreases. Thus, progress in the useful arts is retarded
by governmental patent ownership.
Fourth, the high level of government patent application activi-
ty 116 contributes to the backlog of the patent office.117 This
lengthens the amount of time it takes all patent applications to
be processed, both government and private. This delay has the
effect of retarding the progress of the useful arts. As long as an
invention or discovery is not the subject of an existing valid pat-
ent held by another, there is a common law right for one to pri-
vately practice one's own invention either openly or in secret as a
trade secret. However, because there is no common law right to
exclude others from practicing the invention once it is made pub-
lic, private inventors are reluctant to reveal the method of prac-
ticing their inventions until their patent applications are pro-
cessed by the patent office and patents are issued. Thus, the
longer the patent application process takes, the longer the public
is deprived of the information which would have been revealed in
the private applicant's patent disclosure.
Fifth, governmental ownership of patents unconstitutionally
removes information from the public domain. The Graham Court
held that in the exercise of the Intellectual Property Clause,
"[C]ongress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain,
or to restrict free access to materials already available."'
When the federal government obtains a patent based on work
which was done with public funds, it is basing its patent on infor-
mation which the federal government is holding as the corporate
agent for the American public. 19 Federal governmental patent-
115. See Berger, supra note 2, at 455-56.
116. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 383.
117. As of July 4, 1995, the average backlog of the Patent Office examining
group as measured by the new case date was 1.4 years. 1176 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE
32 (1995). The new case dates ranged from 0.9 to 2.3 years. Id.
118. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
119. See Broder, supra note 7, at 698.
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ing of such publicly-owned information has the effect of taking
the information out of the public domain. The patenting restricts
free access to the information because it limits the use of the in-
formation for the life of the patent to the federal government and
its licensees. Thus, the patenting by the federal government
produces results which are counter to the federal government's
constitutional authorization under the Intellectual Property
Clause. Furthermore, the federal government's relatively recent
adoption of a policy of granting exclusive licenses to patents12°
brings us to exactly the situation which the Framers knew the
Statute of Monopolies was designed to prevent-the granting by
the sovereign of monopolies over what otherwise would had been
in the public domain.
C. No Constitutional Power Exists for Federal Governmental
Ownership of Patents
Some argue that the source of power for the federal govern-
ment to own self-issued patents arises under constitutional provi-
sions other than the Intellectual Property Clause. These suggest-
ed alternative sources of power include the Commerce
Clause, 1 the War Powers Clause,'22 the Property Clause,'
the General Welfare Clause,'24 the Revenue Clause, 2' and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.'26 However, none of these powers
120. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states: "Congress shall
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. See Elliot Gerber, Patents under the Com-
merce Clause, 44 J. PAT. OFF. SOC" 127, 130-32 (1962); Dan L. Burk, Protection of
Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study of Federal Preemption, 23 SETON
HALL L. REV. 560, 614-15 (1993); Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 27-29.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The War Powers Clause states: "The Con-
gress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defence . . . of the United
States.' Id. See Burk, supra note 121, at 615; Wille, supra note 6, at 740-41.
123. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Property Clause states: "The Congress
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting . . . Property belonging to the United States." Id. See Burk, supra note 121,
at 615; Wille, supra note 6, at 736-40.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The General Welfare Clause states: "The
Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare of the Unit-
ed States." Id. See Wille, supra note 6, at 740-44.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Revenue Clause states: "The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts . . . . [B]ut all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." Id. See Wille, supra note 6, at 740-45.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause states:
"The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
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provides the necessary authority for the federal government to
own patents. Application of the standard rule of construction,
generalia specialibus non derogant, which means that a special
provision as to a particular subject-matter is to be preferred to
general language,'27 defeats these Clauses as possible sources of
authority for governmental ownership of patents. The Intellectual
Property Clause is undeniably the most specific constitutional
clause with respect to patents. In light of the above discussion re-
garding the intention of the Framers to restrict patent monopo-
lies and the ways in which governmental ownership of patents
conflicts with the Clause, it is clear that the Intellectual Property
Clause does not provide the federal government with the power
to own patents and prohibits it altogether. Thus, the broader
clauses cannot be found to authorize powers which the more
specific clause prohibits.
Consideration of the constitutional aspects of the governmental
ownership of patents of its own issue has demonstrated that such
ownership is unconstitutional. Not only is the requisite constitu-
tional authorization absent, but the practice is contrary to the
very limited grant of power which authorizes the federal govern-
ment to issue patents. The next section will make clear that,
constitutional issues aside, it is also improper for the federal
government to own patents of its own issue.
III. COLLATERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL
OWNERSHIP OF PATENTS
There are a number of non-constitutional arguments which
have been raised by commentators against governmental owner-
ship of patents. These include the sovereign grant merger doc-
trine, "'28 several contract doctrines,129 and the argument that
patent ownership is inconsistent with other governmental du-
partment or Officer thereof." Id. See Walterscheid, supra note 80, at 27-30.
127. See Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87-90 (1902). The Rodgers
Court noted that where two provisions or acts cover the same matter and conflict,
the more special one must be taken to govern, especially when the provisions or acts
are contemporaneous. Rodgers, 185 U.S. at 90. See also Busic v. United States, 446
U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (giving a more specific statute preference over a more general
one, regardless of order of enactment); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,
353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957) (holding that specific terms prevail over general terms
in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling); Stonite Prod-
ucts v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 561-67 (1942) (holding that specific venue
statutes for patent suits prevail over general venue statutes); Gerber, supra note
121, at 127.
128. Thomas Ewing, Government Owned Patents, 10 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 149,
153-54 (1928).
129. See Wille, supra note 6, at 745-46.
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ties. 3' To these may be added a fourth argument countering a
line of Supreme Court cases which has found that the federal
government has a common law right as an employer to patent
certain inventions created by its employees.'31 The argument in
this last instance is that the Court has overlooked the fact that
as a sovereign, the federal government is not like any other em-
ployer. The federal government has powers and potentials for
abuse of patent rights that make the federal government sui
generis."2 Therefore, the federal government should be treated
differently with respect to patent ownership than any other em-
ployer.
A. Sovereign Grant Merger Doctrine
Thomas Ewing, a former Commissioner of Patents, has argued
that the federal government cannot confer rights upon itself by
its own grant. He based this argument on the doctrine of sover-
eign grant merger.'33 Ewing attributes this doctrine to Thomas
Paine."3 The essence of the doctrine is that when a patent or
other grant of right issued by a sovereign returns to the hands of
the sovereign, its existence is extinguished. The concept is that
because the patent grant is a specific issue of authority flowing
from the sovereign's general authority, the specific authority
merges back with the general authority and ceases to exist as a
separately identifiable parcel of authority when returned to the
sovereign.' Applying this doctrine to governmental ownership
of patents of its own issue, when a patent returns to the hands of
the sovereign which issued it, the specific grant of sovereign au-
thority contained in the patent to exclude others from using the
subject invention merges with the general sovereign authority of
the government and thus becomes extinguished as a separate
grant of authority. In effect, the patent becomes a nullity by the
very incidence of governmental ownership.
B. Contract Doctrines
As described above, a patent is a contract between the United
130. See Ewing, supra note 128, at 154-56.
131. See infra Section III.D.
132. "Sui generis" means of its own class, i.e., the only one of its kind. BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
133. See Ewing, supra note 128, at 153-54.




States Government and an inventor.' The federal government,
for its consideration to support the contract, provides the inven-
tor with the statutory right to exclude others from making, sell-
ing, or using the subject invention for a set number of years.3 7
The inventor's consideration is disclosure to the public, by way of
the publication of the patent, of a detailed description of the in-
vention.' 8
Contract doctrine provides five fundamental reasons why the
federal government cannot properly own patents of its own issue.
The first of these is that it is a tenet of the law of contracts that
there must be at least two parties to a contract.'39 Thus, a par-
ty cannot contract with itself." In acquiring a patent of its own
issue, either directly or through the inventor on its own behalf,
the federal government is in effect contracting with itself and,
thus, no valid contract can result.'
The second contract law-based reason is provided by the con-
tract merger doctrine.' The contract merger doctrine holds
that where a contractual promise returns to the hand of the
promisor, the promise disappears and the contract is extin-
guished." In acquiring a patent of its own issue, the federal
government is receiving back its own promise to give the patent
holder exclusive use of the patented invention. Under the con-
tract merger theory, this promise, and the patent contract which
embodies it, is extinguished by the merger of the promise back
into the federal government as promisor of the exclusive rights.
The third reason is that the federal government lacks the ca-
pacity'" to enter into a patent contract to acquire patents of its
own issue. " The lack of capacity results from the fact that the
federal government can only act within its constitutional authori-
zation and, as discussed above, no such authority exists. An act
by the federal government for which it is has no authority is
ultra vires.'" Therefore, when the federal government attempts
136. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
137. See ROSENBERG, supra note 17, § 1.02.
138. Id.
139. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 20 (3d ed. 1990).
140. MURRAY, supra note 139, § 28 n.4.
141. See Wille, supra note 6, at 746.
142. Id. at 747.
143. Id. (citing Persky v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 185 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1933)).
144. "Capacity" is defined as legal qualification, competency, power or fitness.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1990).
145. An essential element for contract formation is that the parties must have
the legal capacity to contract. MURRAY, supra note 139, § 28.
146. MURRAY, supra note 139, § 22. "Ultra vires" results when an act is per-
formed without any authority, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
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to enter into a patent contract to obtain a patent of its own issue,
it is acting ultra vires and lacks the capacity to make a valid
patent contract.
The fourth reason involves the unenforceability of a contract
made for an illegal purpose. "7 Because the Intellectual Proper-
ty Clause disallows the federal government to own patents, the
patent is for an illegal purpose when governmental ownership of
the patent is involved. In such a case, the patent becomes a con-
tract facilitating an illegal purpose and therefore becomes unen-
forceable.
Lastly, as a consequence of the sovereign grant merger doc-
trine, any contract by the federal government with regard to a
patent of its own issue is void for lack of consideration on the
part of the federal government as the promisor of the patent
right.' It is void because the patent rights are extinguished
upon their return to the hands of the sovereign which issued
them and cannot constitute the valuable consideration necessary
to sustain a valid contract.
C. Inconsistency with Other Duties of the Federal Government
The ownership of patents is inconsistent with other duties of
the federal government. Former Commissioner of Patents Ewing
lists several of the inconsistencies. 4 ' Primary among these are
the federal government's duties regarding patents. Under statute,
the federal government alone has the capacity to bring suit to
have a patent invalidated for fraudulent procurement.' ° There-
fore, there is no party to bring an action against the federal gov-
ernment should it engage in fraud to acquire a patent.
Another inconsistency arises with regard to the governmental
duty under the patent laws to protect patent applications in
secrecy during the time of their prosecution.' The very real
danger exists for the federal government to breach this confiden-
tiality to promote its own patent acquisition efforts over those of
other applicants.
147. Contracts facilitating illegal purposes are unenforceable. MURRAY, supra
note 139, §§ 98a, k.
148. Consideration by each party is an essential element of a valid contract.
MURRAY, supra note 139, § 28.
149. Ewing, supra note 128, at 154-56.
150. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
175 (1965).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988). The word "prosecution" is a term of art denoting
the activity of processing a patent application in the Patent and Trademark Office.
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D. The Federal Government is not "Like Any Other Employer"
As noted above, the primary source of government owned pat-
ents is inventions made by its employees. In a series of United
States Supreme Court cases beginning with McClurg v.
Kingsland... and ending with United States v. Dubilier
Condensor Corp.,"5 3 the Court developed a common law doctrine
which recognized the federal government's right under certain
circumstances to acquire patents to inventions made by its em-
ployees. The basis of the doctrine was that the federal govern-
ment was like any other employer and was therefore entitled to
the rights enjoyed by other employers. Thus, the Court reasoned
that the common law rights of an employer with regards to the
inventions of its employees should apply to the federal govern-
ment. 
154
However, what the Court failed to consider is that the federal
government has one paramount distinction pertinent to patent
ownership that sets it apart from all other employers. That dis-
tinction is that the federal government is a sovereign. Unlike
other employers, the federal government is limited to the rights
it can have by the United States Constitution. As already demon-
strated, there is no constitutional authority for the federal gov-
ernment to hold patents. Also, the federal government, due to its
sovereign status, has the potential to abuse patent rights in ways
in which no other employer could. Therefore, the federal govern-
ment is unlike any other employer with regard to the ability to
enjoy patent rights. The Supreme Court, like Congress, may not
grant the federal government the power to hold patents where
the Constitution denies the power."5
152. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843) (establishing that an employer is entitled to a
shop right in inventions made by employees which utilized the employer's material
and time).
153. 289 U.S. 178 (1933) (stating that the federal government is entitled to
common law rights as an employer to inventions made by its employees). In addi-
tion, the line of cases includes the following: United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 246 (1870) (holding that the federal government must compensate a govern-
ment employee patent holder, not specially employed for inventing, for the use of
the invention), James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881) (holding that the Constitu-
tion evinces no policy requiring the holder of a patent to cede the use or benefit of
the invention to the United States), United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888)
(reaffirming Burns), Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890) (holding that
the federal government has no more power than any other employer to acquire the
patent rights to an invention made by its employees) and Gill v. United States, 160
U.S. 426 (1896) (holding that the federal government is entitled to a shop right in a
government employee invention which was perfected using government resources).
154. Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 187-92.
155. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (Marshall,
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In sum, governmental ownership of patents of its own issue is
unconstitutional. In addition, several collateral legal theories
have elucidated the impropriety of such ownership. The next
section demonstrates that such ownership is also unnecessary
because there are other means available to fulfill the federal
government's primary objective of patent ownership---protecting
the federal government against unwarranted claims of unlicensed
use of inventions.
IV. THE LACK OF NEED FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO OWN
PATENTS
The great irony is that as long as the federal government in-
tends to use its patents without the abuse of conferring privileges
of any sort, there is no need for it to own patents. Many of the
public funds that have been expended over the years in a good
faith effort by the federal government to protect the fruits of
publicly funded research by acquiring and administering a vast
number of patents could have been saved. The contribution to the
backlog at the Patent and Trademark Office by the large volume
of government patent applications and the restraints on the prog-
ress of the useful arts by governmental ownership of patents
were also unnecessary. This is because other means are available
for accomplishing what the federal government seeks to achieve
by obtaining patents.
First, it should be noted that the federal government, under its
Eminent Domain Power," has the ability to use any patented
invention as long as it compensates the owner for the use of the
invention.'57 Thus, the federal government can make unlicensed
use of any patented invention. A patent owner has the statutory
right to collect compensation in the amount of a reasonable roy-
alty by bringing suit against the federal government in the Court
of Claims."'5 The patent owner cannot obtain an injunction
against the federal government to stop the federal government
from using a patent.'59 Thus, the federal government can make
C.J.) (holding that the judiciary, as well as all branches of government may act only
according to the Constitution).
156. U.S. Const. amend. V.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988). See McGrath, supra note 56, at 351-52. See also
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 526-40.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1498a (1988).
159. Id. The patent owner's remedy under § 1498 of an action against the
United States for recovery of compensation has been judicially interpreted as exclud-
ing the availability of an injunction against the federal government to stop the gov-




uninterruptable use of the invention described within any patent
of its issue as long as it pays a reasonable amount for its use if
the owner brings suit to collect such payment.
However, when the subject invention has been developed with
public funds, it is prudent for the federal government to defend
against the possibility of being sued to pay patent royalties for
use of the invention. Historically, such a defensive purpose has
been the goal behind governmental efforts to obtain patents. 6 '
But another means is available to the federal government to
obtain the desired protection. The filing of a Statutory Invention
Registration ("SIR")'6' provides all the defensive benefits of a
patent while avoiding the constitutional infirmities associated
with governmental ownership of patents of its own issue.
An SIR, in essence, is a disclosure of an invention made to the
Patent and Trademark Office (the "PTO") without the acquisition
of the exclusive rights characteristic of a patent."2 To obtain an
SIR, a submission must be made to the PTO of a description of
the invention with the same level of detail that is required for
obtaining a patent.'63 The PTO publishes the disclosure without
160. See Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights, supra note 2, at 1091-92.
161. 35 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
162. Id. The pertinent parts of § 157 read as follows:
Statutory Invention Registration
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Commissioner is
authorized to publish a statutory invention registration containing the specifi-
cation and drawings of a regularly filed application for a patent without exam-
ination if the applicant-
(1) meets the requirements of section 112 of this title [dealing with the
level of detail of the description of the invention];
(2) has complied with the requirements for printing; as set forth in
regulations of the Commissioner;
(3) waives the right to receive a patent on the invention within such
period as may be prescribed by the Commissioner; and
(4) pays application, publication and other processing fees established by
the Commissioner.
If an interference is declared with respect to such an application, a statutory
invention registration may not be published unless the issue of priority of
invention is finally determined in favor of the applicant.
(b) The waiver under section (a)(3) of this section by an applicant shall take
effect upon publication of the statutory invention registration.
(c) A statutory invention registration published pursuant to this statute shall
have all the attributes specified for patents in this title except those specified
in section 183 [right to compensation of use by the govermnent] and sections
271 through 289 [dealing with rights to exclusive use and remedies for in-
fringement] of this title. A statutory invention registration shall not have any
of the attributes specified for patents in any other provision of law other than
this title.
Id.
163. See supra note 162. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text for a
description of the level of detail required in a patent disclosure.
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the governmental expense or delay of the examination for statu-
tory classification, novelty, or non-obviousness it would give a
patent application."4 An SIR has all the attributes of a patent
under the patent codes except for the right to exclusive use of the
invention.'65 An SIR may also be used in the PTO administra-
tive adjudicatory process for determining priority of invention,
known as an interference proceeding.'66 Further, an SIR has
the advantage of providing for a more rapid publication than does
a patent because the time consuming examination process is
absent. Also, an SIR is not compromised by prior publication as a
patent application would be. This is because an SIR's only func-
tion is as a defensive publication against a later inventor obtain-
ing a patent on the disclosed invention.'67 Finally, an SIR may
serve as the basis for a priority claim in filing a foreign patent
application in the same manner as a patent.6 8
Thus, by obtaining an SIR instead of a patent on an invention,
the federal government can obtain all the defensive protection
that it requires. Because the monopoly aspect of a patent is ab-
sent, ownership of an SIR does not present the problems of
unconstitutionality that patent ownership does for the govern-
ment. Also, because an SIR is not a grant of a parcel of sovereign
authority embodying a promise to provide for exclusive use of the
subject invention, the collateral legal problems related to the
sovereign grant merger doctrine and contract doctrines are ab-
sent with ownership of an SIR. Further, the danger of inconsis-
tency with other governmental duties is much more remote with
governmental ownership of an SIR than it is with a patent of its
own issue.
Finally, the cost of an SIR is less than that of a patent. The fee
for an SIR is lower due to the fact that no examination by the
PTO for novelty is required. 6 ' The expedited PTO processing
route for an SIR in comparison to a patent also means that the
legal costs of preparing and obtaining an SIR are lower. Finally,
the lifetime cost of an SIR is lowered further because there are
164. 35 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). Indeed, the legislative history of § 157 reveals
congressional recognition of an SIR as a faster, less expensive method of providing
the same defensive protection of an invention as is given by a patent. 130 CONG.
REC. H10,525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5831.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1988).
166. Id. § 157(a).
167. See 130 CONG. REC. H10,525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828.
168. Id.
169. At present, the fee for obtaining an SIR is $840. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(n)
(1995). In comparison, the minimum fee for acquiring a patent is $1,940 ($730 filing
fee plus $1,210 issuance fee). Id. §§ 1.16(a), 1.18(a).
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no maintenance fees for an SIR as there are for a patent.'70
Thus, from the viewpoint of cost and constitutionality and propri-
ety, it would be advantageous for the federal government to ac-
quire SIR's rather than patents to defend its rights to inventions.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the matter has almost completely escaped attention, a
close look reveals that it is unconstitutional for the federal gov-
ernment to own patents of its own issue. Not only is there nei-
ther express nor implied power in the Constitution for such own-
ership, but the practice in several ways contravenes the Intellec-
tual Property Clause's narrow grant of authority to the federal
government to issue patents. First, governmental ownership of
patents amounts to an artifice that puts into the hands of the
federal government the ability to grant monopolies at will and by
favor, a practice that runs counter to the Framers' clear abhor-
rence of the dispensation of monopolies by the sovereign. Second,
governmental ownership of patents runs counter to the express
purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause. Whereas the Intellec-
tual Property Clause allows the issuance of patents only for the
promotion of progress in the useful arts, governmental patent
ownership restrains such progress. Third, governmental patent-
ing restricts access to knowledge which is already owned by the
public, an effect which the Supreme Court in other contexts has
found to be counter to the Intellectual Property Clause.
In addition to being unconstitutional, governmental ownership
of patents is improper for a variety of reasons. Analyses of the
sovereign merger doctrine, contract principles, and the inconsis-
tencies of the practice with other governmental duties clearly
indicate that it is improper for the federal government to own
patents of its own issuance. Further, the primary argument justi-
fying governmental acquisition of patents from its largest source
of patents-its rights as an employer to the inventions by govern-
ment employees-was based on an oversight. What was over-
looked is the fact that the federal government, as a sovereign, is
distinct from all other employers in that it alone is subject to
170. Maintenance fees are required to be paid every four years during the
statutory patent period to keep the patent in force. See supra note 25 for a descrip-
tion of the patent period. The maintenance fees increase as the patent matures:
$960 at four years, $1,930 at eight years, and $2,900 at twelve years. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.20(e), (g) (1995). Thus, the maintenance fees total $5,790 for a patent kept in
force for the entire statutory period. Combining the maintenance fees with the issu-
ance fees yields the lifetime cost in terms of governmental fees as $840 for an SIR
and $7,730 for a patent.
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constitutional provisions which prohibit its ownership of patents.
Finally, there is no need for the federal government to acquire
patents. The federal government has the ability to use the inven-
tion described in any patent it issues, though it may have to pay
a reasonable royalty in cases where the patent owner brings suit
for such payment. Further, Statutory Invention Registrations
could be used by the federal government to gain all the defensive
benefits of a patent without offending the Constitution and with-
out a large portion of the cost involved in obtaining and main-
taining a patent.
The time of blissful ignorance of a constitutionally infirm prac-
tice should be ended. The needless spending and the restraint on
the progress of the useful arts should be curtailed. The embar-
rassment of exclusive patent ownership by the federal govern-
ment should be suffered no longer.
Thomas Lizzi
